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divided between radical reactionaries whose backward vision often drew on the prin-
c iples of the old republic and an adaptive libertarian wing that privileged the 'free 
market.' As Bjerre-Poulsen explains, both elements were necessary to the growth of 
the conservative movement - though the contradictions between them were so severe 
for many years that the leading journal of the movement, the National RevieH1, spon-
sored a semi-official 'fusionist ' position designed lo hold the movement together. The 
National Review became the voice of a self-appointed 'sane' and respectable conser-
vatism, effectively purging the movement of its most extreme e lements - those like 
Robert Welch, founder of the John Birch Society, who saw a communist conspiracy 
deep inside the ran.ks of the American political class. In effect, what Bjerre-Poulscn's 
work points the way toward is a larger study of prec:isely how the conservative move-
ment prepared itself for taking power. Bjcrre-Poulsen has given us one part of that 
narrative of preparation - as the politically and institutionally dysfunctional elements 
of conservatism were weeded out to produce an ideology that, despite being contra-
dictory and unpalatable to many, could in fact permit its adherents to govern. 
Mark Luccarelli University of Oslo 
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In the Preface to his book Daniel Ellsberg stales that 'the focus of this memoir' (viii) 
was the background of his decision to copy and make public the top secret study later 
known as The Pe111agon Papers (hereafter 711e Papers). The focus, however, has a 
wide lens and captures three subjects: the personal story; the case of The Papers; and 
the system of secrecy and lying at the top of the executive branch of government. 
I 
In describing the events, atmospheres, and analyses that resulted in his fateful deci-
sion, Ellsberg narrates his transformation from a cold-war warrior to a Vietnam dove, 
becoming perhaps the 20th century's most famous American whistle blower. Millions 
of Americans experienced the same transformation, many of them earlier and more 
quickly, but few if any had Ellsberg's wealth of fi rst-hand information. 
Ellsberg's decision to copy and give to the New York Times the seven thousand-page 
study of decision-making regarding Vietnam led to a fedP-rnl court-order to stop pub-
lication. The court order was the first-ever under the constitution. David Rudensline 
documents well Urnt story 's importance in his The Day the Presses Stopped: A Histo1y 
of the Pentagon Papers Case (1 996). Wi thin the White House, Ellsberg's decision lo 
leak to the press led to illegal wiretaps and to the creation of a secret team, later 
known as the Plumbers, to prevent future leaks. Jn an attempt to discredit Ellsberg 
and discourage would-be whistle blowers, the Plumbers burglarized the office of 
Ellsberg's psychiatrist. On June 17, 1972 police arrested some of the Plumbers in the 
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Watergate building office of the Democratic Nationa l Committee. The cover-up of 
that burglary and its exposures led to the firs t presidential resignation. 
The third theme ofEllsbcrg's book, in addition to his personal transformation and the 
case of The Papers, appears on most of the book's pages and provides the apt title 
Secrets. Starting in 1964, when be became special assistant to John McNaughton, 
then assistant Secretary of Defense, Ellsberg observed consistent deception, misrep-
resentation, hypocrisy, <lnd lying wi thin the executive branch of the govenunent. 
Cloaking this broad pattern of behavior was a policy of secrecy to keep Congress and 
the public from learning of military actions in Southeast Asia and the decision-
making process behind those actions. The secrecy and deception included top-level 
officials unwilling to tell the truth to the President, who, in turn, distorted, misled and 
lied to Congress and the public about decisions and policies. 
II 
Ellsberg serves as an example of the shattering of the liberal Cold War foreign policy 
consensus. A native of Detroit whose high school hero was labor leader Walter 
Reuther, Ellsberg won a scholarship to any college in the country. He chose Harv<ml, 
married, started graduate school , and then enlisted in the Marine Corps as an alterna-
tive to the draft. After three years as a Marine, the last two as a company commander, 
Ellsberg used a fe llowship to earn a PhD in economics from Harvard. In 1959 he 
joined the economics department of the Rand Corporation, a think-tank whose pri-
mary client was the federal government. At one point Defense Department contracts 
accounted for three-quarters of its budget. 
On August 4, 1964 Ells berg, on leave from Rand, became McNaughton's special 
assistant. The events of that day led Congress to pass the Tonkin Gulf Resolution 
authorizing President Lyndon B. Johnson to take whatever military action he deemed 
necessary in Southeast Asia. Two years later Ellsberg volunteered to serve in Vietnam 
as a member of an inter-agency liaison team headed by Edward G. Lansdale, a retired 
air force general. Once in Vietnam, officially as a State Department representative, 
Ellsberg observed and evaluated pacification programs and other military and civil ian 
operations. In the summer of 1967 Ellsberg returned to the Defense Department and 
started to work on the recently-launched study of Vietnam decision making. He chose 
to work on President John F. Kennedy's 1961 decision making. 
After five years of intense, varied governmental experience with Vietnam, Ellsberg 
returned disillusioned to the Rand Corporation. This experience, plus 'the system of 
secrecy and lying' (205) at the top levels of the executive branch of government com-
bined with the growing anti-war movement, had convinced him that Vietnam 'had 
been wrong from the start. ' The war's continuation, therefore, was ' A crime. An Evil' 
(257). 
Ellsberg's discussion of his transformation of his views toward Vietnam raises the 
question of why the change took five years. Ellsberg recounts that during the summer 
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of 1965 he asked McNaughton what his wife thought about Vietnam. McNaughton 
replied that his wife ' th inks we're out of our minds. She thinks what we' re doing is 
insane' (87). In October 1967 President Johnson's press secretary, Bill Moyers, told 
Ellsberg that he wished for Johnson's defeat. Along with Vice President Hubert 
Humphrey, whom he admired, Ellsberg stayed the course. The best rationale he offers 
is that being an insider was addictive. 
Ill 
For years that addiction made palatable to Ellsberg and the policy-makers the consis-
tent lying, secrecy, distortion, and hypocrisy that characterized United States involve-
ment in Southcusl Asia. This included Johnson's 1964 campaign theme that 'we seek 
no wider war' (50), while he already had planned escalation, and Johnson's criticism 
o f his Republican opponent, Barry Goldwater, for his willingness to use tactical 
nuclear weapons whi le Johnson concealed the fact that his commanders already had 
such authori ty. Officials withheld from the President any disagreement with policies. 
Military and civilian reports from Vietnam often rested on false information and dis-
honest analyses. Ellsberg found especially dis turbing the 1948 Stale Department doc-
ument that reflected opposition to self-determination for Vietnam although Ho Chi 
Minh had the support of 'considerable majority of the Vietnamese people ... .' (252). Tn 
his 1963 memoirs former President Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote that had Vietnam 
held a free e lection in 1954 Ho Chin Minh possibly would have won eighty percent of 
the vote. Unti l the end of the involvement, under Republican and Democrats presi-
dents, the United States opposed self-determination in Vietnam. Looking back more 
than three decades later, Ellsberg summarized that he viewed Vietnam 'first as a 
problem, next as stalemate, then as a moral and political disaster, a crime' (vii). For 
the United States, the moral disaster started during the Harry S. Truman administra-
tion and its opposition to an independent Vietnam with a leader who enjoyed popular 
support. 
IV 
Once his addiction wore off, E llsberg realized that only pressure from the public and 
from Congress could change the president's pol ices. In October 1969 he secretly 
copied the completed Papers and then attempted to enlist the support of Senators J. 
William Fulbright, George McGovern, Gaylord Nelson, and Charles Mathias to use 
the information to expose the system of lies and secrecy sunoLmding Vietnam. They 
opposed the war but declined to offer significant help. 
F inally, in late winter 1971 Ellsberg gave copies of The Papers to Neil Sheehan of the 
New York Times. On June 13, that paper published the initial installment. Two days 
later, afte r the third installment appeared, Attorney General John Mitchell demanded 
the Federal district court Lo issue an injunction and stop further publication. On June 
18, however, the Washington Post started publication of its own series, but soon fell 
under an injunction. So, too, did the Bo~·ton Globe when it started publication of The 
Papers. Seventeen other papers started their own se1ies. In response to the New York 
Times appeal tbe Supreme Cou1t lifted the injunctions. 
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Ellsberg, meanwhile, had gone underground for twelve days while the FBI searched 
for him as the source of leaking the top-secret Papers. If convicted of a dozen Federal 
felony charges Ellsberg faced a possible 115 years in prison. When the FBI issued a 
wairnnt for his arrest, Ellsberg reported to Federal court for arraignment. The judge 
presiding over Ellsberg's trial eventually dismissed the government's case in light its 
suppression of evidence, its destruction of relevant documents, and its invasion of the 
patient-physician relationship. While the trial was going on, newspapers revealed that 
weeks earlier the judge had met with President Nixon and his adviser John 
Ehrlichman. The judge and Ehrlichrnan even met a second time. Ironically, the 
Attorney General who had indicted Ellsberg, John Mitchell, went to prison for his 
crimes in the Watergate affair. 
v 
'This book,' Ellsberg explains, 'represents my continuing effort - far from complete 
- to understand my country's war on Vietnam, and my own part in it.. .. ' (vii-viii). Of 
the book's three subjects, one, The Papers, is straightforward but a second, the system 
of secrecy and lying that dominated the formulation and execution of Vietnam policy, 
because of its complexity, continues to attract a multitude of scholarly examinations. 
Thirty years after the events, Ellsberg still does not understand fully his transfonna-
tion from supporter to opponent of the war. Many Americans likewise still wonder 
how a generation of national leaders could have made so many decisions that pro-
duced such disastrous results. Ellsberg's book reads easily but its descriptive nature 
cannot provide the answer to why responsible leaders acted the way they did and 
devised the policies they did. As early as the summer of 1965 John McNaughton's 
wife understood clearly. 
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That few if any American states have received as much attention a~ California is 
hardly surprising. Its size, history and influence; its status as both host to many 
leading educational institutions and source of much of the nation 's media and cultural 
output; and its conespondingly distinctive place within the public imagination - all 
have helped attract scholarly and popular concern. Carey McWilliams' California: 
The Great Exception. ( 1949) and Kevin Starr's multi-volume history, Americans and 
the California Dream (1973 to date), are only some of the most renowned works in 
what is therefore a sizeable field. An appreciative blurb from StaiT features on the 
back cover of Kirse Granat May's Golden State, Golden Youth: The California Image 
in Popular Culture, 1955-1965 and does so deservedly, since hers is an insightful 
addition to a distinguished literature. 
